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Corporate Power, Law, and the Multina-
tional Corporation: A Contemporary
Reading of Dodge v. Ford
JAN G. DEUTSCH*
Treating Dodge v. Ford as the precedent which serves as a symbol
for legal control of corporate activity, Professor Deutsch analyzes
thepOliticalforces which led to that decision. He also surveyspoliti-
calforces and legalprecedents which may render such legal control
ineJfective in connection with multinational corporate entities.
Henry Ford symbolizes many things in the history of the United
States. Developer of the automobile, implementer of projects to end
international conflict, family patriarch, opponent of labor unions, he
represents an individualism which manifested itself in a variety of
political and economic forms during the 19th century. In political
terms, the 19th-century movement characterized as Progressive ad-
vocated "direct" democracy at home (symbolized by such reforms as
the initiative, the referendum, and election of judges) and attempted
to restrict involvement in international affairs to "principled" uses of
national power like the convening of conferences and formulation of
agreements in pursuit of such ends as the renunciation by nations of
the right to resort to arms.
Corporations were regarded as dangerous entities by Progres-
sives because the accumulation of capital made possible by the cor-
porate structure was perceived as permitting persons in control of
such entities to wield inordinately large amounts of economic power.
It was this perception that led the Michigan Supreme Court in lJodge
v. Ford Motor Co., 1 in response to Henry Ford's plan to expand his
production facilities while reducing the selling price of his cars, to
warn:
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1. 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
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The difference between an incidental humanitarian expenditure of
corporate funds for the benefit of the employees, like the building
of a hospital for their use and the employment of agencies for the
betterment of their condition, and a general purpose and plan to
benefit mankind at the expense of others, is obvious. There
should be no confusion (of which there is evidence) of the duties
which Mr. Ford conceives that he and the stockholders owe to the
general public and the duties which in law he and his codirectors
owe to protesting, minority stockholders.2
The Michigan Supreme Court recognized that "[i]n view of the
fact that the selling price of products may be increased at any time,
the ultimate results of the larger business cannot be certainly esti-
mated. The judges are not business experts."3 As a result, while it
did force the payment of dividends, which Ford had attempted to
discontinue, the court refused to enjoin the building of River Rouge.
Invocation of the business judgment rubric had effectively shielded
corporate activity from judicial control.
It is the purpose of this Article to demonstrate that in today's
world it is the concepts underlying the business judgment rubric
which provide an effective shield against judicial intervention. De-
fmed in terms of long-run profit maximization, that rubric gives to
decisions an advantage shared by all actions described in quantifi-
able terms: that of appearing to be sufficiently certain and objective
for direct comparison with alternatives. The "direct" democracy es-
poused by the Progressive movement was based on a belief that po-
litical systems, like economic ones, were legitimate only when
founded on such direct comparisons; and that the selection ofjudges
by appointment was inadequate precisely because the power to inter-
pret judicial precedents was sufficiently great that individuals'wield-
ing it should be selected by the direct comparisons involved in the
electoral process.
I.
Current attempts to limit corporate power are focused on defm-
ing standards of "fairness" with which persons in control of corpora-
tions must comply. Two recent decisions of the Delaware Supreme
Court are illustrative of such attempts. In Singer v. Magnavox Co. ,4
that court held that the merger of a parent corporation with its
2. Id at 506-07, 170 N.W. at 684.
3. Id at 508, 170 N.W. at 684.
4. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
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eighty-four-percent-owned subsidiary would be fair only if the evi-
dence supported a corporate purpose other than the elimination of
the minority interest. In Tanzer v. International General Industries,
Inc.,5 the court held that a merger which conveyed a benefit to the
parent corporation sufficed to meet such a standard, but the case was
remanded for a determination of the "entire fairness" of the transac-
tion. The scholarly comment was: "Just how such a reexamination
is to be carried out remains something of a mystery."6 Such a reac-
tion is strikingly reminiscent of the Progressive distrust of the lack of
certainty characteristic of common law. The most likely outcome of
the Tanzer order is that the remand will control corporate behavior
by making settlement cheaper than the cost of future litigation, and
the merger will bear the extra cost of settlement.
Delaware cases, though perceived as defming the standard to be
applied to parent-subsidiary relationships, also raise the issues
presented by multinational corporate activities. In 1971, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court reversed a determination by the Chancellor7
that the test of "intrinsic fairness" had been violated by the payment
of dividends to a parent by its subsidiary. In reversing, the court
defined ''the basic situation for the application" of that test as "one
in which the parent has received a benefit to the exclusion and at the
expense of the subsidiary"8 and noted that "[t]he plaintiff [subsidi-
ary] proved no business opportunities which came to [it] indepen-
dently and which [the parent] either took to itself or denied to [the
subsidiary]."9 Responding to the claim that the magnitude of the
dividends deprived the subsidiary of resources needed for its own
development, the court pointed to the fact that "all of [the subsidi-
ary's] operations have been conducted in Venezuela, and [the parent]
had a policy of exploiting its oil properties located in different coun-
tries by subsidiaries located in the particular countries."10
The holding that the standard of fairness had been met thus
seems based on a fmding of historical regularity-the demonstration
by the parent that it had consistently followed a policy of utilizing
separate corporate subsidiaries to pursue business opportunities in
separate national communities. Such a position would obviously
5. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
6. Brudney and Chirelstein, A Restatement 0/Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354,
1365 (1978).
7. Levien v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 261 A.2d 911 (Del. 1969).
8. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
9. /d at 722.
10. /d
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have been both easier to argue and more difficult to refute if each
separate nation had enacted a law restricting business opportunities
located within its boundaries to corporate entities that accepted local
participation in some designated form. While such policies have re-
cently been proclaimed by many nations, they have been accompa-
nied by a concern that their implementation is in many cases
responsive to what the governments involved perceive to be satisfac-
tory to one or more multinational corporate entities.
Nor is the issue of the political impact of the economic power of
multinational corporations restricted to its effect on governmental
policy. Assume, for example, in connection with a question of plant
location, that the majority of the inhabitants in the immediate vicin-
ity of the proposed location are in fact perceived as a cohesive and
threatening minority in the larger political unit with which negotia-
tions concerning the plant are being conducted. As soon as employ-
ment demands made by the local residents are regarded as entailing
costs in addition to those imposed by the demands of the larger polit-
ical unit, the corporate entity, in deciding which demands to meet,
will necessarily be taking actions with significant domestic political
repercussions.
In general terms, the corporate response, if accepted, will be de-
fming the nature of the community capable of making such demands
in the future. The Progressive concern with corporate power thus
becomes, not the question of the nature of political control of corpo-
rate economic behavior, but the issue of the extent to which eco-
nomic behavior should be permitted to defme the political unit
. possessing the potential for control.
II.
The political concepts in terms of which decisions such as those
adumbrated above are made cannot without significant loss be
quantified. As a result, the bases for those actions cannot directly be
compared to quantifiable types of data. This loss, because it makes
direct comparisons impossible, presents insuperable obstacles to the
implementation of the "direct" democracy espoused by Progressives.
More importantly, lack of quantifiability precludes any requirement
that the concepts on which those actions are based be given precisely
the same meaning by different individuals; and the resultant varia-
tions in individual defmitions necessarily produce potential gaps in
communication among the individuals making such decisions.
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Social science theorists in the 1950's ascribed the origin of such
a situation to the replacement of Gemeinschaft by Gesellschaft.
Gemeinschaft, for this purpose, can be defmed as the situation in
which the economic organization deemed socially necessary is per-
ceived by the individual as sufficiently small in scale itself to provide
a basis for community. Mass production, on the other hand, in-
volves economic organization on a scale perceived as antithetical to
the expression of individual skill that constitutes the basis for com-
munity participation. The specialization required by such organiza-
tion divides many business decisions into a variety of aspects, each
involving a specialized field of knowledge. Because only some of
those aspects are capable of quantification without significant loss,
however, this process necessarily produces the gaps in communica-
tion described above.
In terms of the Dodge v. Ford precedent, it is clear that the mass
assembly techniques which made possible Ford's plans for River
Rouge necessarily supplanted craft skills and techniques perceived
as sufficiently small in scale to provide the basis for Gemel",,-schaft.
The resultant emphasis on the volume of production, rather than
quality or diversity, also produces significant social effects when
viewed from the standpoint of consumption. Expanded application
of mass production techniques substantially raises the cost of goods
readily distinguishable from those generally available, a fact that
renders the use of conspicuous consumption as a mechanism for per-
sonal identity increasingly difficult. Thus, as demonstrations staged
for the mass media make clear, personal identity has in more and
more instances become defmed through public recognition of self as
a member of a group devoted to a given aim.
The implication for law of this social phenomenon-the shift in
focus from the individual to the group--constitutes one of the
reasons Brown v. Board 0/ Education II can be characterized as a
landmark decision in the jurisprudence of the United States. Not
only was that decision the result of a carefully-organized group cam-
paign of litigation,12 but the grade-a-year desegregation programs
upon which settlements were often based also denied to given indi-
vidual plaintiffs the very right to an integrated education for which
suit was being brought.
The significance of self-conscious group legal activity in connec-
tion with United States politics can most clearly be portrayed in con-
II. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
12. Vosc, Litigation as a Form ofPressure Group Activity, 319 ANNALS 20 (1958).
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nection with Smith v. Al/wright. 13 In that case, the Supreme Court
held unconstitutional attempts to exclude persons on the basis of
race from participating in primary elections conducted by the Texas
Democratic Party, which was treated by the applicable state law as a
private voluntary institution. Herbert Wechsler condemned that de-
cision as unprincipled because it seemed to him necessarily to bar
the organization of political parties exclusively on the basis of reli-
gious, economic, or social classifications or ideologies. 14 In a review
of Wechsler's argument, Professor Ernest Brown denied that the
Supreme Court's decision entailed what he agreed would be an im-
permissible limitation on the formation of political organizations:
Cause and effect are difficult to establish in political institutions,
but it is at least a tenable thesis that the system of legally signifi-
cant primary elections is an outgrowth of a party system in which
the major parties, to which primaries significantly relate, have his-
torically been amorphous, heterogeneous, and heterodox. In
dealing with an institution in what is, I should think, its predomi-
nant historical and functional context, it seems questionable that
Smith v. Al!wright can be considered unprincipled because it did
not anticipate possibilities lying in a hypothetical, and different,
future. IS
As a result of awareness of the advantages inherent in organized
litigation, possibilities, characterized as hypothetical by Brown, are
rapidly brought to court in an attempt to test the (;mtermost limits of
an announced judicial policy. The result of this phenomenon-the
loss of the characteristic of randomness in the flow of litigation-is
to make it more difficult for judicial decisions to be accepted as
promulgating generally applicable standards, a problem explored in
the next Section in the context of constitutional standards that must
be met by domestic political efforts to control economic activity.
III.
Given the difficulties encountered by federal and state judges in
promulgating workable standards of implementation, it has become
clear that certain language in Warren Court decisions in areas such
as reapportionment must in the future be construed narrowly. What
has not been clear is the extent to which this process of qualification
13. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
14. H. WECHSLER, Toward Neulral Principles ofConslilulionaI Law, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 3, 30-40 (1961).
15. Brown, Book Review, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 386, 391 (1962).
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may make social control of economic activity an increasingly diffi-
cult task.
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey,16 a declaratory action on
behalf of bondholders, involved a challenge to New York and New
Jersey statutes which repealed a prior statutory covenant limiting the
ability of The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey to subsi-
dize rail passenger transportation. The United States Supreme
Court, fmding the legislation to be violative of the Contract Clause
of the United States Constitution,17 reversed the New Jersey
Supreme Court's per curiam affirmance of the trial court's ruling
that the statutory repeal was a reasonable exercise of New Jersey's
police power. Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice White
and Mr. Justice Marshall joined in dissent, argued that "[t]oday's
decision.... by creating a constitutional safe haven for property
rights embodied in a contract. . . substantially distorts modem con-
stitutional jurisprudence governing regulations of private economic
interests,"18 and that "[d]ecisions of this Court for at least a century
have construed the Contract Clause largely to be powerless in bind-
ing a State to contracts limiting the authority of successor legislatures
to enact laws in furtherance of the. . . collective interests of the pol-
ity."19
The lengthy case survey in terms of which the United States
Trust Co. dissent attempts to establish the last proposition20 is remi-
niscent of the canvassing of "political question" decisions under-
taken by Mr. Justice Brennan in 1962 in Baker v. Carr21 to establish
the proposition that "the complaint's allegations of a denial of equal
protection present a justiciable ... cause of action."22 The Frank-
furter dissent in Baker v. Carr argued:
The Court today reverses a uniform course of decision estab-
lished by a dozen cases, including one by which the very claim
now sustained was unanimously rejected only five years ago. . . .
Disregard of inherent limits in the effective exercise of the Court's
judicial Power not only presages the futility of judicial interven-
tion in the essentially political conflict of forces by which the rela-
16. 431 U.S. I (1977) [hereinafter cited as United States Trust Co.].
17. "No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts...."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, d. I.
18. United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 33.
19. Id
20. Id at 45-6 I.
21. 369 U.S. 186, 210-37.
22. Id at 237.
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tion between population and representation has time out of mind
been and now is determined. It may well impair the Court's posi-
tion as the ultimate organ of "the supreme Law of the Land" in
that vast range of legal problems, often strongly entangled in pop-
ular feeling, on which this Court must pronounce?3
The basis for the Frankfurter warning was that more than one
line of precedent is arguably applicable to almost every case ac-
cepted for decision by the Supreme Court. As a result, almost every
decision requires that cases held not to govern the situation being
adjudicated must be reinterpreted in ways consistent with the result
arrived at. Decisions that require significant reinterpretation of
prior precedents threaten damage to the image largely responsible
for public acceptance of the binding nature of the Court's opinions:
the perception that the holding represents a conclusion derived from
a reasonably stable set of rules embodied in judicial precedents.
Thus, whether or not one agrees with the decision reached, it
seems important that the majority in United States Trust Co. holds
that "[t]he trial court's 'total destruction' test is based on what we
think is a misreading of W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S.
56 (1935),"24 whereas the dissent states:
The Court, as I read today's opinion, does not hold that the
trial court erred in its application of the facts of this case to Mr.
Justice Cardozo's formulation. Instead, it manages' to take refuge
in the fact that Kavanaugh left open the possibility that the test it
enunciated may merely represent the "outermost limits" of state
authority.... This, I submit, isa slender thread upon which to
hang a belated revival of the Contract Clause some 40 years
later.25
As argued in the prior Section, perhaps the most significant im-
pact of self-conscious group utilization of the legal process is that it
will henceforth take considerably less than a generation to test the
meaning of a judicial declaration concerning "outermost limits."
The next Section of this Article delineates one possible result of the
changed perception of law resulting from this fact in connection with
multinational corporate activities.
IV.
A 1968 Second Circuit decision, construing Rule lOb-5 of the
23. ld at 266-67.
24. 431 U.S. 1,26 (1977) (footnote omitted).
25. ld at 57 (emphasis added).
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Securities Exchange Act of 193426 as imposing stringent limitations
on securities transactions involving controlled corporations, indi-
cated to the dissenters the dangers in utilizing litigation costs as a
control device:
What this amounts to is giving carle blanche to every holder of a
few shares in any corporation whose stock is traded on the New·
York or American stock exchanges to give his imagination full
rein in the making of any sort of extravagant charges, no matter
how ill founded in fact they may be, and then, when faced with a
summary judgment motion based upon personal knowledge and
documentary proof, say simply "I know nothing whatever about
the matter but hope my lawyer will find something if we conduct
extensive discovery proceedings and compel the defendants to
produce their complete files." This, while doubtless not so in-
tended, is in my judgment nothing short of a standing invitation to
blackmail and extortion. It is perfectly apparent that the expense
of such discovery proceedings to the defendants, especially when
they are foreigners as in this case, will be enormous; and a plain-
tiff and his lawyer under these circumstances would seem to have
some justification for hoping they will be bought off in one way or
another, despite the falsity of the allegations in the complaint.27
The opinion in question, Sehoenbaum v. Firs/brook, was ren-
dered on rehearing en bane and involved Banff Oil Ltd., a Canadian
corporation, and Aquitaine Company of Canada, Ltd., the wholly-
owned subsidiary of a French corporation. In February of 1964,
Aquitaine acquired control of Banff and designated three of its rep-
resentatives to sit on Banffs eight-person board of directors. In the
following month, the two corporations agreed to conduct joint explo-
rations for oil, and in December of that year, Banffs board of direc-
tors voted to offer 500,000 shares of Banff treasury stock to
Aquitaine. A test well struck oil on February 6, 1965.
26. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate co=erce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a mate-
rial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 24O.lOb-5 (1969).
27. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 221 (1968), cerl. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
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The petition for rehearing en bane sought reconsideration of the
issue whether, as the trial judge had held, the defendants were enti-
tled to summary judgment in a derivative action on behalf of Banff.
The plaintiffs there had alleged "that the defendants, knowing of the
oil discoveries and the consequent increase in value of Banff stock,
sold [all] of that stock to Aquitaine ... at vastly inadequate prices
as a result of a conspiracy ... to enrich Aquitaine ... at the ex-
pense of Banff."28
In the dissent's view, the en bane reversal of the panel's uphold-
ing of the trial judge's grant of summary judgment was based upon
an erroneous assumption of fact:
We proceeded in the panel opinion upon the assumption that
both parties to the transaction of purchase and sale of the Banff
treasury stock knew Banff had struck oil because Judge Cooper
proceeded upon the same hypothesis. In retrospect it is now ap-
parent that it was a mistake to have made this contrary-to-fact
assumption as it has thrown the whole case out of focus.29
It is likely, however,3o that the crucial fact was that the corporations
were "taking advantage of [an] Alberta law permitting ... with-
hold[ing] [of] information concerning [the oil] discovery for one
year";31 that the en bane holding was based on a perception of for-
eign law being utilized in an attempt to justify a deviation from the
directives embodied in United States securities legislation.
Even if one assumes that Sehoenbaum v. Firstbrook is in fact a
holding that United States securities legislation overrides inconsis-
tent foreign law, its current significance is that "[t]he court en banc
has not reviewed the [panel] decision. . . on the issue ofjurisdiction
.. and that decision stands as the holding of the court."32 The
28. fd at 218.
29. fd at 220.
30. See, e.g.:
It is argued that the agreement to sell Banff stock to Aquitaine was entered into
before the results of the oil exploration were known. However it is by no means
clear that the letter of Aquitaine's president dated January 5, 1965 resulted in the
formation of a binding contract. Moreover in the absence of an opportunity for
discovery procedures it cannot be accepted as true that on January 5, 1964 [sic) or at
the earlier date in December, 1964 when Banff made the offer to sell, the parties were
not in possession of sufficient information as to the true value of Banff stock to make
the sale at market price a fraud on Banff. In addition, whether Aquitaine's acquisi-
tion of the Banff stock on the eve of the completion of the first oil well constituted
overreaching presents an issue to be resolved only after an opportunity for further
investigation.
fd at 220.
31. fd at 221.
32. fd at 217 (emphasis added).
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dissent argued that the difficulty with Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook was
that it "transform[ed] a simple cause of action against directors for
waste or the use of bad judgment in the sale of corporate assets into a
federal securities fraud case by judicial.fiat,"33 a holding that would
be reversed by the Supreme Court's decision in Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores.34 The holding on jurisdiction, however, im-
posed the costs connected with the possibility of federal securities
litigation solely on the basis of the act of listing securities on a na-
tional securities exchange:
[T]he district court found that the only harm alleged was to the
foreign corporation on whose behalf plaintiff brought the action.
We do not agree. A fraud upon a corporation which has the ef-
fect of depriving it of fair compensation for the issuance of its
stock would'necessarily have the effect of reducing the equity of
the corporation's shareholders and this reduction in equity would
be reflected in lower prices bid for the shares on the domestic
stock market. This impairment of the value of American invest-
ments by sales by the issuer in a foreign country, allegedly in vio-
lation of the Act, has in our view, a sufficiently serious effect upon
United States commerce to warrant assertion of jurisdiction for
the protection of American investors and consideration of the
merits of plaintiffs claim.35
If costs of litigation are perceived as outweighing the benefits
conferred by such listing, one possible remedy would be simply to
leave the jurisdiction. Any given national legal system, in other
words, can enforce substantive domestic policies on multinational
transactions only so long as the advantages of that system are per-
ceived as outweighing th~ costs entailed in leaving the jurisdiction.
To a considerable extent, multinational corporations could contract
out of all legal systems simply by expending the resources required
to obtain more precise drafting of contractual agreements explicitly
dealing with the widest array of possibilities, and accepting the costs
of resort· to arbitration. Indeed, existing forum selection clauses
demonstrate awareness of the possibility of treating choice of law as
an aspect of a transaction subject to corporate control. The
Supreme Court's decision in MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. 36
explicitly recognized that such a clause could effectively block the
enforcement of substantive domestic social policy.
33. Id at 220.
34. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
35. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208·09 (1968) (footnote omitted).
36. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
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The Bremen was a tug owned by a German corporation, which
was towing respondent's ocean-going drilling rig under a contract
exculpating it from liability for damages and providing that "[a]ny
dispute arising must be treated before the London Court of Jus-
tice.,,37 When the rig was damaged in international waters in the
middle of the Gulf of Mexico, respondent, a United States corpora-
tion, commenced suit in admiralty in a United States District Court.
Vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which had
"suggested that enforcement [of the forum selection clause] would be
contrary to the public policy of the forum under [an earlier Supreme
Court decision barring exculpatory clauses],"38 the Supreme Court
held that the earlier decision "rested on considerations with respect
to the towage business strictly in American waters, and those consid-
erations are not controlling in an international commercial agree-
ment."39 It then quoted with approval the dissent in the Court of
Appeals, which argued that the policy promulgated by the earlier
Supreme Court decision should be extended to multinational trans-
actions only if it is demonstrated that no business judgment has been
made on the contractual clause at issue:
[T]wo concerns underlie the rejection of exculpatory agreements:
that they may be produced by overweening bargaining power; and
that they do not sufficiently discourage negligence. . . . Here the
conduct in question is tha.t of a foreign party occurring in interna-
tional waters outside our jurisdiction. The evidence disputes any
notion of overreaching in the contractual agreement. And for all
we know, the uncertainties and dangers in the new field of trans-
oceanic towage of oil rigs were so great that the tower was unwill-
ing to take financial responsibility for the risks, and the parties
thus allocated responsibility for the voyage to the tow. It is equally
possible that the contract price took this factor into account.40
Given the increasing significance of the multinational activities
of corporate entities, the Bremen decision threatens substantially to
dilute even the symbolic cont~nt of Dodge v. Ford as a citation of
authority for the possibility of legal control of corporate action.
37. fd at 2.
38. fd at 15.
39. fd at 15-16.
40. Id at 16.
